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This paper analyses different operational central bank policies and their impact on 
the behaviour of the money market interest rate. The model combines profit 
maximising behaviour by commercial banks with the central bank supplying the 
liquidity that keeps the market rate on target. 
  It seems that frequent liquidity supplying operations represent an efficient tool 
to control money market rates. An averaging provision reduces the use of standing 
facilities and interest rates volatility in all days except for the last day of the 
maintenance period. Whenever banks have different maintenance horizons both 
the spikes in volatility and use of standing facilities disappear. The paper also 
compares two different liquidity supply policies and finds that the level of 
liquidity necessary to keep the rates on target depends on not only the aggregate 
but also assets values of individual banks. 
 
Key words: Interbank market, interest rate volatility, central bank procedures, 
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Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
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Michal Kempa 




Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan keskuspankin likviditeetinhallintajärjestelmän 
vaikutuksia rahamarkkinoiden korkoihin. Tarkastelujen teoreettinen malli kuvaa 
voittojaan maksimoivia pankkeja sekä keskuspankkia, joka likviditeetin tarjonnal-
laan pyrkii pitämään rahamarkkinoiden korot tavoitetasolla. Tutkimuksen tulokset 
osoittavat, että rahamarkkinakorkojen vaihteluita voidaan hallita useasti toistuvien 
rahamarkkinoiden likviditeettioperaatioiden avulla tehokkaasti. Varantojenpito-
jakson viimeistä päivää lukuun ottamatta vähimmäisvarantojen keskiarvoistami-
nen vaimentaa korkovaihteluita ja vähentää keskuspankin maksuvalmius-
järjestelmän käyttöä pankeissa. Toisistaan poikkeavien varantojenpitojaksojen 
tapauksessa huipentumat sekä korkovaihteluissa että keskuspankin maksuvalmius-
järjestelmän käytössä häviävät. Työssä verrataan myös kahta vaihtoehtoista 
likviditeetintarjontamallia ja päätellään näiden tarkastelujen perusteella, että 
voidakseen vakauttaa korot tavoitetasolle keskuspankin on markkinoiden 
likviditeettitilanteen lisäksi otettava huomioon yksittäisten pankkien maksu-
valmius. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkien väliset rahamarkkinat, korkovaihtelut, keskuspankin 
menettelytavat, avomarkkinaoperaatiot 
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T h ev i e wt h a tt h ec e n t r a lb a n k( C B )e x e r t sa ni n ﬂuence over the economy by
using interest rates as a direct tool has now been widely accepted for some
time. The exact mechanism of control over the interest rate, or so called the
operational policy has however attracted much less attention and very often
is taken for granted. This particular research niche has recently seen some
revived interest resulting in a series of publications; many questions however
remain still open.
The operational policy targets the level and volatility of the interbank
market interest rates, and basic instruments at the CB disposal include:
an obligatory reserve requirement, open market operations (OMO) and
lending/deposit facility. So far no golden rule for the eﬀective operational
policy mix has been found. Indeed, countries over the world have decided in
favour of very diﬀerent setups and none of them can claim perfect control, even
though all are successful in setting the rates on target level in the long term.
There are several issues to consider, such as the balance between intensity (or
willingness) of the central bank intervention and the volatility of interest rates.
Still countries using similar tools experience systematic patterns of interest
rate behaviour, overcoming country speciﬁc features. For example, a system
with an averaging reserve requirement, infrequent (ie not daily) open market
operations and a wide channel of standing facilities (similar to the one present
in Eurozone and the US) apparently experiences fairly low volatility during
the maintenance period, but risks regular spikes around the end of the periods
(see Figure 1 that presents the time series of target and market rates). On
the other hand, countries such as Canada or Sweden, supplying the liquidity
through daily OMO and narrow standing facilities rates (thus running a more
active policy) enjoy much less volatility of interest rates at the cost of a less
active interbank market and a higher degree of central bank intervention (see
Figure 1). Somewhere in the middle is the UK with its system of an one-day
maintenance period and daily interventions.
The similarities in patterns of interest rate behaviour between markets as
diﬀerent as the US and the European, justify several research questions. What
i st h ei m p a c to fd i ﬀerent aspects of operational policies on the behaviour of
the money market? How does the volatility of interest rates change when a
diﬀerent mix of the operational policy instruments is applied? What is the
impact on the use of central bank standing facilities be used? Suppose the
central bank commits to a speciﬁcp o l i c y—w h a ti st h ev o l u m eo fo p e nm a r k e t
operations that would keep the rates on target? The usual approach is to
target the aggregate liquidity, without consideration of the individual shock
distribution across banks. What if the information about the distribution was
actually included in the decision process? The following paper addresses those
questions.
The money market despite its central position in the central bank policy,
has only recently started to attract appropriate amount of attention. An
excellent and extensive introduction to the ﬁeld is presented by Bindseil (2004).
Hamilton (1996) expressed formally one of the most important hypothesis
related to the market: money market funds should be perfect substitutes
7Figure 1. Target and money market interest ratesin all days of the reserve requirement period, which implies the interest rates
should satisfy martingale property. He then analysed the data series for the
US and found it did not hold, which sparkled lots of research on that topic.
Most of them was based a single bank’s proﬁt maximising behaviour in a
general equilibrium setup, in a spirit of Poole (1968). For the Eurosystem
an interbank model was designed in Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal
(2001), Gaspar et al (2004). Analogous references for the USA are Bartolini
et al (2001, 2002), both analyses, however, strictly tailored to country-speciﬁc
features. They have concentrated on the volatility of the interbank interest
rates in diﬀerent stages of the maintenance period as a phenomenon crucially
dependent on the obligatory reserve requirement. In these models the emphasis
is on the commercial bank’s behaviour, while the role of the central bank as
the initial supplier of the liquidity is very often simpliﬁed by assuming the
starting assets as given.
Models that overcome these limitations were created by Välimäki (2003),
Moschitz (2004) where the supply of the funds by central bank is included as
well. Those papers do not however explore the details of the optimal level
of liquidity. The model which is closest to mine paper is Bartolini and Prati
(2003) where they investigate market volatility under a spectrum of diﬀerent
policies for liquidity supply, using similar methods. In their model OMO take
place every day, with its volume chosen so to minimise the deviation from the
target rate. Without any restrictions that approach leads to the full control
over the rates which is not realistic. That result is replicated as one of the
sub-cases in this study as well. To bring their study a bit closer to reality
then, they constrain the central banks actions by introducing some arbitrary
limits on the volume of the interventions. In this paper a diﬀerent approach
is used where the central bank is restricted by the operational policy details
(such as timing or frequency of OMO) rather than its ability to oﬀset liquidity
shocks. Bartolini and Prati (2003) do not also analyse the impact of periodic
OMO or eﬀects of the policy setting neutral liquidity.
F i n a l l yt h er e g i m ew h e r et h eb a n k sh a v ed i ﬀerent maintenance period dates
has been discussed only in Cox and Leach (1964) but without rigorous analysis.
The paper contributes to the existing research in several ways. First, it
simulates the behaviour of money market under diﬀerent regimes within one
framework. This provides an opportunity for a clear comparison of policy
performance measured in terms of the use of the standing facilities or volatility
of interest rates.
Second, active central bank liquidity supply policy, provides a benchmark
against which neutral market liquidity targeting can be compared.
Third, the regime with overlapping maintenance periods has not been
properly examined before in the literature, while it is a potentially very
interesting case combining some of the beneﬁts and costs of existing policies.
This study is structured in the following way. Section 2 contains the basic
model structure. Sections 3 and 4 include details on the liquidity demand
(commercial banks) and supply (central bank) side of the market. In section
5 I present the results for diﬀerent simulations and ﬁnally section 6 concludes.
92 Model overview
Every day banks are involved in scores of transactions, resulting in changes of
their own as well as market liquidity. From the perspective of individual banks
some can be predicted in advance with a fairly good accuracy — an example
would be maturing securities — but others constitute a stochastic shock. The
money market in this world is used to help to manage liquidity and moderate
the liquidity shocks. The banking market is governed by standard economic
rules, where excess liquidity depresses the interest rate and free funds shortage
drives it up. A policy targeting the level of the interest rates can therefore be
implemented through channels that control the market liquidity.
The market liquidity is settled during open market operations before the
interbank trade is closed, which is incorporated in the structure of the model
by using simple two-stage framework. In the early stage the central bank sets
the value of market liquidity, and in the latter one banks trade excess resources
at the market rate. More speciﬁcally the timing of events in the market is as
follows:
1. A commercial bank starts the day with a balance at the CB account mt.
2. Open market operations start, as a result, the bank’s current account
balance changes by θt.
3. An early stochastic shock ε1t occurs
4. The interbank money market opens with banks trading assets bt at an
market clearing interest rate it.
5. A late stochastic shock ε2t occurs after no trade is possible anymore.
After that, the ﬁnal bank balance in the central bank is calculated, and
constitutes the opening balance for another day. Depending on the sign,
the bank automatically refers to either the deposit or the lending facility.
mt,1 θt ε1t bt ε2t mt+1,1
− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Combining the steps 1—5 results in the following diﬀerence equation
mt = mt−1 + bt + θt + εt (2.1)
where mt denotes the assets in the central bank, bt denotes net change in
interbank lending, θt is the balance of open market operations and εt = ε1t+ε2t
is the sum of stochastic shocks during a day.
The shocks capture the imperfect information that is faced by both central
bank and commercial banks and here are assumed to have the same variance
σ.O n eo ft h es h o c k s ,ε1t , apart from shifting the liquidity between banks has
also an aggregate impact on the market. In the a real life this occurs whenever
there is a change in balance of so called autonomous liquidity factors1 such as
1Bindseil (2004) provides a following deﬁnition of autonomous liquidity factors: ‘All items
in the balance sheet of the central bank that do not reﬂect monetary policy operations, or
the reserve holdings (that is, the ‘deposits’ or ‘current accounts’) of banks with the central
bank’.
10currency balances or government accounts. The other shock, ε2t is idiosyncratic





i=1 ε2ti =0 .
The interbank trade is driven by proﬁt maximising banks that cash the
proﬁts on lending, but are subject to two constraints:
1 .T h ee n do ft h ed a yb a l a n c ea tt h ec e n t r a lb a n ka c c o u n tm u s ts t a y
non-negative — otherwise, the bank is forced to automatically use the
Central Bank lending facility
2. An average level of reserve requirement must be satisﬁed throughout the
maintenance period.
More detailed explanation is included in the following section, but it might be
useful to look into one-period commercial bank expected proﬁt function
Πt = itbt − Et(ct) (2.2)
where it denotes the interbank interest rate, bt bank choice of lending value
and Et(ct) is the expected cost of using the standing facilities after the ﬁnal
liquidity shock arrives. The proﬁt maximisation problem has to be solved
in an environment with stochastic liquidity shocks (denoted εt before). Note
that from the bank perspective the early shock is less interesting since it can
be oﬀset during the interbank trade. Any mistakes in calculations of the late
shock however force the bank to use costly standing facilities.
The central bank goal is to keep the market interest rates as close to the
target as possible. To achieve it, it supplies the liquidity both actively, using
open market operations (denoted θ), and passively, using standing facilities.
Depending on monetary policy setups, the extent and frequency of open market
operations may diﬀer, but their value is set so as to keep the market rates on
the target. The deposit and lending facilities help the banks to manage the
uncertainty. Should an individual bank’s current account balance turn negative
in the end of the day, the bank recourses to (marginal) lending facility. If the
account value exceeds the amount of reserve requirement, the bank settles a
deposit. The interest rates for standing facilities are accordingly il for lending
and id for deposit and they are tied to the target by the assumption that the
target rate i∗ =( il + id)/2 ie lies exactly in the middle of the channel system
( a si st h ec a s ef o re x a m p l ef o rE C B ) .
In practice averaging provision reserve requirement means that the bank
has to accumulate a ﬁxed amount of funds on its account during the
maintenance period. Denote this amount by R and dt by the time t deﬁciency,
dt satisﬁes
d1 = R (2.3)
2In the Eurozone, the late liquidity shock results usually from smaller transactions hence
its relative lower signiﬁcance comparing to the early shock. In the simulation however,






di−1 if mi < 0
di−1 − mi if 0 <m i <d i−1
0 if mi >d i−1
(2.4)
for any T ≥ i ≥ 2,w h e r eT is the end of the maintenance period. If dT >m T +
εT the bank does not satisfy its reserve requirement at the end of the day T,
and it has to refer to the central bank standing facilities without extra penalty.
There is no interest capitalisation and time span is only one maintenance
period. No change in the regime or level of target interest rate is assumed in
the paper.
3D e m a n d s i d e
This section presents the model of the commercial banks behaviour in the
interbank market. The chapter follows quite closely the works of Välimäki
(2003), Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2001).
3.1 No reserve requirement
Without reserve requirement, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between diﬀerent
days. The situation is similar on the last day of the maintenance period in the
regime with reserve requirement. The expected proﬁt function of the banks
takes the one-period form
Vt =m a x
bt
Et(Πt)=Et(itbt − ct) (3.1)
where itbt stands for the proﬁt from interbank lending and E(ct) denotes












(mt − bt + θt + εt)f(ε2t)dε2t
¸
(3.2)
where f(ε2t) denotes the density function of the shock. The expected cost
for individual bank is calculated using the fact that whenever the negative
liquidity shock does not exceed the bank’s current account balance at the end
of the day (given by mt +θt −bt −ε2t), the remaining assets are remunerated
at id interest rate. Otherwise bank is forced to use borrowing facility at the
rate il.
Using the Leibniz Rule and ﬁrst order conditions one arrives at the well




d)Fε2t(bt − mt − θt − ε1t) (3.3)
12with Fε2t(.) as the associated distribution function of the ε2t late shock.
The interbank interest rate is equal to the expected cost of using the CB
lending/borrowing facility. (3.3) holds for all the banks and the inverse of
normal distribution function F
−1





d)F(−Mt − Θt − ¯ ε1t) (3.4)
Bank loans net up to zero, Mt =
Pn
i=1 mi
t is the aggregate amount of funds at




is the aggregate shock value. This result indicates how the central bank, by
controlling the aggregates, can inﬂuence the level of interest rates, without
worrying of the distribution of assets across banks. This is a very strong
result, giving support to the policies of several central banks that tend to
use only aggregated liquidity information when calculating the allotment.3
Note, however, that it holds only under fairly strong assumptions (identical
distribution, no reserve requirement) that do not necessarily survive extensions
into more general settings.
Before moving further, one last remark. The case described in this section
has a straightforward extension to a regime with reserve requirement but
without averaging provision (as hitherto in the United Kingdom). It is enough
to add a constant term, equal to the required reserves, to the expression in
brackets in (3.4) in the last day of maintenance period and leave the equations
in other days unchanged.
3.2 Reserve requirement
3.2.1 Last day of maintenance period T
In the last day the situation is very similar to the case above, except for the












(mT − bT + dT + θT + εT)f(ε2T)dε2T
¸
(3.5)
Solving the ﬁrst order conditions associated with the optimisation problem




d)F(bT + dT − mT − θT − ε1T) (3.6)
This expression is essentially the same as eq. (3.3) with the term dT being only
diﬀerence. Note that since dT ≥ 0, the amount the bank is willing to lend at
some interest rate level i, with the same asset m and OMO θ volume, will be
3In case of the ECB, so called benchmark allotment value is calculated by adding up
the realised and expected ﬁgures for aggregate deﬁciency and autonomous liquidity factors
(past and predicted) from one OMO to another.
13lower in the regime with reserve requirement than without. This result is quite
intuitive, but it has a direct implication. Once the equation is aggregated —




d)F(DT − MT − ΘT − ¯ ε1T) (3.7)
with the aggregate borrowing cancelled out. Now the interest rate is a function
of large aggregates. Hence the following property holds. In the last day of the
maintenance period, the distribution of the individual shock among banks has
no impact on the interest level and neutral market liquidity results in the rates
in the middle of channel system. The neutral liquidity is deﬁned as the level
of funds that will be just enough to satisfy reserve requirement. The last part
of the property results from the normal distribution assumption (F(0) = 1/2)
and often is used as a basis for the central bank liquidity supply policy. This
issue is discussed in more detail later on.
3.2.2 Days before end of maintenance period t<T
Let’s move now to the earlier stages. The value function in Bellman’s equation
takes the form
Vt =m a x
bt
Et(Πt + Vt+1)=m a x
bt
Et(itbt − ct + Vt+1)
The interest rate that solves that problem for each individual bank can be
shown (check Pérez-Quirós and Rodrígues-Mendizábal (2001) for proofs) to
satisfy
it = i


























The intuition behind these results is as follows: marginal beneﬁts (it) are equal
to the weighted cost of: 1. referring to the lending facility (when the shock
exhaust all the funds at the current account), 2. deposit facility (the shock is
high enough to exceed the required reserves) and 3. the impact of decreased
deﬁciency today on the proﬁts in the future (the shock value keeps the balance
positive, but does not exceed the deﬁciency).
Contrary to the case without reserve requirement, the optimal borrowing
value cannot be calculated explicitly from (3.8). That means the market
clearing condition must be derived using numerical methods.
Recall the aggregation procedure used to calculate equation (3.4) for the
last day of maintenance period. The single market rate implies the liquidity
14value (bT + dT − mT − θT − ε1T) for all banks was the same, so the interbank
market (term bt) only function was to equalise the liquidity among banks. That
also allowed for easy aggregation and, with the assumption of shock normal
distribution, observation that neutral liquidity leads to the markets rate in the
middle of channel system. An inspection of equation (3.8) reveals that it is
not the case anymore in the periods preceding the end of maintenance period.
The banks will consider not only current liquidity position, but also future
implications. That reﬂects the phenomena pointed out by Pérez-Quirós and
Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2001) ie banks care about the future probabilities of
referring to standing facilities, more speciﬁcally the increased probability of
being forced to use deposit facility once the reserve requirement buﬀer is lost.
In some extreme cases (a bank hit by a series of shocks) the last term might
be much more important than current liquidity which might have profound
consequences for the value market liquidity that would set the rates on target.
These issues must be taken into consideration when designing the optimal
policy setup.
3.2.3 Diﬀerent settlement dates
Finally, I also want to look into the case where banks are required to maintain
the reserve requirement during a maintenance period, but the end of the period
is diﬀerent for the groups of banks. That would allow the banking sector to
operate as a whole with a lower total amount of funds and cancel the regular
spikes presently observed at the end of the maintenance period. In principle,
bank policy still follows the same equations (3.6) and (3.8), but the diﬀerence
shows up on the aggregate level now. The periodic spikes in this setup will
be smoothed. No predictions however can be made about the magnitude of
volatility.
A potential weakness of this type of regime has been raised by some policy
practitioners: it seems that the banking sector would have the possibility to
transfer the liquidity to the banks that end the maintenance period, and ignore
the reserve requirement in every other day. At ﬁrst sight it seems that such a
behaviour would vastly reduce the structural deﬁcit of funds which is supposed
to be the basis of eﬀective operational policy. Taking a closer look at averaging
provision however helps to realise that these concerns are misplaced. Aggregate
current account holdings hardly ever exceed the daily portion of the reserve
requirement (in the model — exactly match) of the whole banking sector, and
hence there is no surplus liquidity on the market.
Another problem may arise whenever there is a change in the target
rate. Taking the ECB as an example, the changes of rates have been
recently synchronised with the maintenance period, in order to prevent
speculative accumulation of liquidity during the period. Letting the end of
the maintenance period dates to diﬀer will obviously increase the level of such
a wasteful activity.
154 Supply side
The supply side — the amount of liquidity the central bank injects into the
market — will be modelled following the approach introduced by Välimäki
(2003) and later on by Moschitz (2004).
First of all, the CB facing a choice how to supply the excess liquidity has
to consider the following trade oﬀs:
1. Daily OMO allow for great ﬂexibility and swift adjustments but might
pose some operational and technical problems,
2. Late liquidity supplying operations (ﬁne tuning or narrow channel
system) essentially set the end of the day rate at speciﬁed target, but
take away some incentives for trading on the interbank market (since the
penalty for using CB facilities is much lower)
3. The reserve requirement allows bank for more ﬂexibility when faced by
the shock, since it works as a buﬀer. Should the bank run short (or
excess) of funds at the end of the day, instead of referring to CB standing
facilities it can ignore it and make up for it later during maintenance
period. The problems however occur around the end of the maintenance
period, when the volatility and level of rates becomes much higher.
An interesting alternative — mentioned already above — that has not however
been implemented in practice, would be to change the averaging provision
regime and allow for diﬀerent settlement dates between banks.
These trade-oﬀs set the frames for the present analysis. By comparing ﬁnal
interest rates and values of CB intervention in diﬀerent regimes it is possible
to evaluate the eﬃciency of each policy mechanism.
In terms of the model, regardless of the applied policy, I assume the central
bank goal to minimise the deviation from the ﬁxed target rate i∗.M o r e









The target rate is linked to the commercial banks behaviour by setting the
middle point of the channel system. Also banks are assumed to expect the
future rates equal to target rate. This assumption is justiﬁed by ignoring the
possibility of changes in the target rates in this paper.
16To achieve its target the central must ﬁnd
1. the amount of liquidity that would induce the interest rate to remain as
close as possible to the target...
2. while using the information about the expected changes in the
autonomous liquidity factors and remaining deﬁciency.
In this study I do not analyse potential additional central banker’s motives
such as supervision of the banking sector or its credit risks, hence the Central
Bank facilities (including OMO) will always be available no matter what is the
value of assets of an individual bank.
Depending on the frequency of OMO the model time horizon T will take
diﬀerent values. In case of daily OMO the CB will be one period looking,
while in case of single OMO T will cover whole maintenance period. Even
though the model assumes the CB carries no cost of OMO, there are still some
other restrictions that render the problem non-trivial. The most important
i st h a tt h eC Bc a nn o ts i m p l ya s s i g naindividual allotment value but rather
an aggregate. In other words, the central bank cannot decide on how much
liquidity each bank receives separately and it must count on the market to
distribute it eﬃciently. There is also another time lag (and shock realisation
ε1t) before CB allotment decision and the interbank market close, so if the
individual liquidity distribution matters, there will be some deviation from
the target.
The exact allotment policy in this model is simpliﬁed to divide the
aggregate amount equally to each banking player. Since the money market
opens after the allotment, banks are free to trade any excess liquidity among
themselves. Hence this assumption is not particularly restrictive.4
4.1 No reserve requirement
Whenever OMO are performed on a daily basis, the aggregate value of the
shock can be corrected by the CB on a daily basis. Available assets for each
bank mt + θt are set by the central bank and the problem of ﬁnding the right





The symmetric corridor with the target rate in the middle, and normal





or using normal distribution property
−Mt − Θt =0 (4.2)
4Actual tender bidding policies of individual banks have been analysed by Välimäki
(2003) and are beyond the scope of this paper.
17so the CB should attempt to sweep away any excess liquidity.
The situation is diﬀerent if the OMO take place once a while, say every Tth






With such a policy, just oﬀsetting predicted liquidity shock might encounter a
major problem. Suppose the CB predicts the aggregate value of autonomous
liquidity factors during T periods to reach some value (say, negative), and sets
t h ea m o u n to ff u n d sa l l o t t e di nt h eb e g i n n i n gs oa st oo ﬀset the sum of the
shock. Clearly, in the ﬁr s tp e r i o dt h a tw o u l dm e a nt h a tt h em a r k e ti sﬂooded
with money and drive the rates all the way to the deposit facility rate. Only
in the last period, the shock will be ﬁnally balanced (if the predictions proved
true) and the rate will reach the target. Indeed, the simulation results indicate
that the optimal allotment value diﬀers from such a policy.
4.2 Reserve requirement
Regardless of the frequency of CB intervention (OMO), the question of the
optimal level of liquidity arises also with the reserve requirement present.
On one hand, more liquidity is needed on the market (higher early CB
intervention), on the other, the liquidity can be used as a cushion against
volatile shocks (less late intervention).
Unfortunately this model oﬀers an analytical solution only for the problem
in the last day of the maintenance period that is a simple modiﬁcation of (3.7).
In all other cases, the CB will face a simple optimisation problem, to be solved
for the optimal amount of liquidity allotment. The details are included in the
section describing a simulation study.
Before the simulation study results, let us come back to the problem of
targeting individual vs aggregate liquidity. The problem is not a trivial issue,
since most popular operating procedures concentrate usually on the aggregate
market shortage or excess. From the results presented so far it seems however
that ignoring the information about individual liquidity can only work properly
in a few regime types (eg without reserve requirement) but otherwise it does
matter. This issue has been also discussed by Bindseil (2004) in relation to
the excess reserves tracking.
First of all, in the last day of maintenance period, the individual assets
history is indirectly included in the aggregate deﬁciency DT, calculated from
the individual deﬁciencies from earlier dates and might diﬀer even though the
market asset value at time T and T − 1 and the aggregate shock realisation
is the same. A simple example with two banks and two periods illustrate
the argument. Two cases with same aggregate values of assets or shocks,
but diﬀerent distributions of starting deﬁciency result in very much diﬀerent
outcome on the market.
18Day T-1 Day T
assets deﬁciency shock assets deﬁciency
bank A 5 1 10 15 0
bank B 5 19 -10 -5 19
Total 10 20 0 10 19
Case1.
Day T-1 Day T
assets deﬁciency shock assets deﬁciency
bank A 5 10 10 15 0
bank B 5 10 -10 -5 10
Total 10 20 0 10 10
Case 2.
I nt h ee x a m p l et h ea g g r e g a t ev a l u eo fa s s e t s( 1 0u n i t s )i sj u s te n o u g ht os a t i s f y
the reserve requirement (total deﬁciency of 20 spread into two days) hence the
central bank not concerned about individual assets would simply refrain from
any intervention (the liquidity shock netting oﬀ to 0). Sticking to that policy
works well in case 2., since the market ends the maintenance period exactly
with neutral liquidity. That, according to (3.7) results in rates on target.
Similar policy fails however to provide the market with enough liquidity in
case 1. That, according to the same formula will result in the market rate
higher from target.
A real-life situation reﬂe c t e di nt h ee x a m p l ea b o v ec o u l da p p e a ri nt h e
regime with periodic OMO, when there is no possibility to alter market
liquidity in the last day of maintenance period. However a regime that would
allow for additional liquidity inﬂow in the last day of maintenance period, (in a
form of ﬁne tuning or additional open market operations) would still be capable
of making necessary correction. This leads to an important observation of the
paper: not only the frequency but also the timing of the operations matter.
This view is apparently shared by the ECB, where the late liquidity operations
have been recently launched.
To conclude this section, the most important ﬁnding is that not only
aggregate value, but also the distribution of the shock among the market
participants might be important. Simple example illustrates the case where
the same initial aggregate market liquidity and deﬁciency might result in very
diﬀerent market clearing rates. This can be managed by appropriate timing,
such as introduction of some form of late interventions.
5 Simulation study
In order to show the aggregate banking sector behaviour, with each bank
borrowing given by 3.8 I turn to numerical methods. In this section the design
and results of the simulation study are presented.
The purpose of the paper is to analyse the impact of diﬀerent market design
on the behaviour for the interbank market. In practice it means I am going
to keep the interbank money market (demand structure) unchanged, while
19experimenting with various ways to supply the liquidity (supply structure).
More precisely the proﬁt maximising behaviour and the exogenous shocks are
g o i n gt ob ek e p tﬁxed, while the value and timing of open market operations
or reserve requirement regime will be altered.
The elements of the operational policy analysed are:
1. The averaging provision regime, with three possible cases
(a) Traditional regime with the same maintenance period for all banks,
(b) Regime without any reserve requirement at all
(c) Regime with diﬀerent maintenance periods for groups of banks,
2. The frequency of the open market operations (early liquidity supplying
operation)
(a) Daily supply (daily OMO)
(b) Periodic supply (once per maintenance period)
3. The volume of the open market operations
(a) Supplying an amount equal to the shortage of funds to the market
(zero-excess liquidity)
(b) Supplying the value of funds using a simple optimisation algorithm
(optimised liquidity).
The reasons these regimes were picked are bound to their resemblance to the
actual policies of central banks. For example, the ECB uses the averaging
provision reserve requirement, periodic liquidity supply with the value equal
to the predicted forthcoming autonomous liquidity factors (aggregate shock in
t h em o d e l )a n dr e m a i n i n gd e ﬁciency.5 On the other hand, Sveriges Riksbank
uses no reserve requirement with daily liquidity operations.
For clarity, the simulation has been divided into 3 sections corresponding
to diﬀerent reserve requirement policy, and then each of 4 regimes is analysed:
• I. Daily OMO, zero-excess liquidity;
• II. Periodic OMO, zero-excess liquidity;
• III. Daily OMO, optimised liquidity;
• IV. Periodic OMO, optimised liquidity
5ECB however performs four liquidity supply operations every maintenance period.
20For each analysed variant of the policy, the following parameters are of
particular interest:
1. The volatility of the interest rate measured during the simulation runs.
2. The volume of trade on the interbank market, measuring how eﬃcient the
banking sector deals with smoothing out the eﬀects of liquidity shocks.
Ideally each individual bank should trade the amount that would leave
it with a neutral liquidity position.
3. The recursion to deposit and lending facilities of the central bank,
showing the level of late intervention
4. The average liquidity left on the market after open market operation
(measured as the sum of liquidity shock and liquidity allotment)
The results are reported in the following sections.
5.1 Method outline
In what follows an outline of method is presented. The details are included in
the appendix.
Following the approach of other researchers in this ﬁeld, commercial banks
expectations of the interest rates will be given by the central bank rates. These
beliefs are conﬁrmed in the data, where indeed the hypothesis of signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between mean interest rates in any day of the maintenance period
is rejected (see eg Moschitz (2004) for EMU data).
There are no frictions on the market that in the real life could are likely to
occur for example due to cross-border cost of information. Hence, the markets
always clear.
The simulation follows the model outline meaning it is divided into demand
and supply part. The algorithm takes the following form (details can be found
in the appendix):
Step 1. The central bank sets a level of aggregate liquidity (supply of
funds).
Step 2. The market clearing rate is calculated (where the aggregate
borrowing ends close to zero)6.
Step 3. Should the market rate end up away from the target, the initial
allotment decision is updated .
When the central bank calculates expected market rate in Step 2., it has
some initial idea about distribution of liquidity, but it may change by the time
the market opens. This reﬂects the fact that in reality central banks have
developed very accurate techniques to predict the aggregate liquidity shocks,
but do not try to guess individual value. This distinction is reﬂe c t e di nt h e
simulation design as well, by allowing two shock realisations. One of them has
an aggregate value diﬀerent from zero (like changes in autonomous liquidity
6I would like to thank Hugo Rodríguez Mendizábal for providing the code used in the
paper ‘The Daily Market for Funds in Europe’ which is the basis of this part of the simulation.
21factors), but known by the central bank. The second part of the shock is
purely idiosyncratic7, and it is excluded from the central bank optimisation
algorithm.
The presentation of the simulation results will be divided into groups,
following the scheme introduced early in this paragraph. For the simulations
the commercial bank assets value mt =2 0 0units is used, with the liquidity
shock variance (ε1t and ε2t) equal to 60. There are N =1 0banks on the
market, and the reserve maintenance period is 3 days. During that period
each bank is obliged to accumulate R =3∗mt =6 0 0units of money, so there
is enough liquidity on the market. The choice of the parameters has been
arbitrary and roughly follows the values used in the existing research.
5.2 Averaging reserve requirement
I start the presentation of the results from the case when the commercial banks
must satisfy the reserve requirement with averaging provision. Within that
framework, there are several interesting extensions, namely the impact of daily
or periodic OMO and which algorithm for funds allotment works better. Note
that one of the cases (no. II in Table 1), ie periodic, zero-excess liquidity OMO
reﬂects quite closely the policy run by the ECB, hence its relative importance
compared to the other cases.
The volume trade on the market diﬀers slightly between allotment regimes,
but is not inﬂuenced by the frequency of OMO. This result is quite intuitive —
the value of trade depends on the variance of assets among banks (all have to
s a t i s f yt h er e s e r v er e q u i r e m e n to ft h es a m ev a l u e )t h a ta r eu s i n gt h et r a d et o
compensate liquidity shocks. The OMO in this setup does not inﬂuence that
variance (the target is the aggregate liquidity) hence its neutral impact on the
trade volume.
The increase in volume can still be observed as the time passes. This is
related to same issues brought up before: all banks in the model start the day
with the same assets, but as the shock realisations build up, the variance of
assets among the banking sector increases. In general, the volume of trade in
that case will be used later on as a benchmark for measuring the eﬃciency of
interbank market, with diﬀerent policy setups.
7This shock reﬂects the balance of payments of transactions taking place inside the
banking sector.
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Day I II III IV
Trade volume on day:
1 718,2 728,2 613,4 719,1
2 1052,8 1033,4 905,4 1041,0
3 1414,2 1394,5 1245,1 1397,6
Recursion to CB deposit facilities on day:
1 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0
2 25,5 12,6 0,0 0,0
3 457,9 286,4 12,8 97,8
Recursion to CB lending facilities on day:
1 4,8 0,6 0,0 1,1
2 21,1 2,6 0,0 2,7
3 411,1 216,3 40,4 50,4
Standard deviation on day:
1 0,020 0,105 0,01 0,07
2 0,050 0,147 0,01 0,06
3 0,217 0,258 0,02 0,08
Average excess liquidity left after intervention on day:
1 0,0 0,0 -224,8 10,4
2 0,0 0,0 217,9 -7,1
3 0,0 0,0 204,0 -16,0
Table 1: Averaging provision reserve requirement
Let’s move on to the use of standing facilities. The use of both facilities —
at least whenever the optimisation algorithm is used — seems limited, with the
jump on the last day of maintenance period. This is plausible; early on it is
still possible to use the funds to satisfy reserve requirement, so there no need to
apply for a deposit. At the same time positive balances serve as a buﬀer from
negative shocks, preventing the lending facility from being used. All these
advantages vanish in end of the maintenance period and result in increased
spike that is also observed in example in Eurozone data (the average recursion
to lending facilities in the period 1999—2005 was roughly 5 times higher on the
last day of maintenance period than in other periods; for borrowing facility
that ratio was around 9). Note that whenever the optimisation algorithm is
used for determine the allotment value, the recursion to standing facilities is
much lower.
Next entry in the Table 1. refers to the volatility of the interest
rates on diﬀerent days of maintenance period. First of all there is a vast
diﬀerence between daily and periodic OMO case. This is not surprising:
the payoﬀ b e t w e e nf r e q u e n ti n t e r v e n t i o na n dr a t e sv o l a t i l i t yh a sb e e nw i d e l y
acknowledged in the literature.
The model predicts that the volatility is increasing toward the end of the
period, especially in the last day. That again is in line with the data (in
Eurozone, the variance of EONIA rate is on average 5 times larger comparing to
other days) and all previous research. This result becomes even more intuitive
once one looks back at plotted demand functions (ﬁgure 2). In the last day of
23the maintenance period the prices elasticities are signiﬁcantly larger compared
to other periods, which means that the interest rates are going to respond
much more to the same shock value comparing to earlier days. Intuitively,
this result has to do with the fact that 1) At least some banks in the market
have already satisﬁed the reserve requirement and hence lost the buﬀer 2) the
others banks balance, to avoid using expensive lending facility must not only
remain positive (as in previous days) but also exceed the deﬁciency value.
Note that the volatility of the rates diﬀers signiﬁcantly between diﬀerent
allotment regimes, which brings me to the last ﬁgures in the table ie the volume
of liquidity required for the interest rates to stay on target. Remember that in
the ﬁrst two regimes analysed (namely I. and II.), the amount of liquidity was
just enough to oﬀset the liquidity shock, while in the other cases (III. and IV.) it
was recalculated based on optimisation algorithm for each iteration separately.
From the simulation run it seems that even such a simple algorithm performs
better comparing to simple zero-excess liquidity policy. Particularly interesting
are the values of intervention in case of daily OMO. It seems that diﬀerent days
of the period require diﬀerent sign of intervention ie the early stage requires
liquidity shortage, then neutral liquidity in middle stage to ﬁnally move to
liquidity surplus in the late stage.
This result is related to the phenomena pointed out by Pérez-Quirós and
Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2001) where they analyse the German money market
before 1999 and notice that the rates tended to be higher in the late days of the
maintenance period, hence the liquidit ya tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o dm u s tb em o r e
valuable. Their explanation is that early in the maintenance period, in order
to enjoy buﬀer of required funds banks deliberately maintain lower liquidity
(suppressing the rates level), a trend that is reversed toward the end of the
period.
There is also another explanation for that, referring to section 4.2. Suppose
t h em a r k e ta sawhole has enough liquidity to satisfy the reserve requirement.
Suppose further that one commercial bank is hit by a series of positive liquidity
shocks which results in that bank fulﬁlling its obligations for that maintenance
period. Now, any positive balance it will happen to hold until the end of the
period will be deposited in the Central Bank and will not contribute toward
satisfying global (market) deﬁciency. That however means that the rest of the
market will be faced with shortage of liquidity, driving the rates above target
level. In other words, the use of deposit facility depletes the pool of funds
that banks use to satisfy reserve requirement. Obviously the problem will be
more severe toward the end of the period. An active CB policy (as the one
using the optimisation algorithm) would incorporate that fact in calculating
the optimal value of liquidity allotment which contributes to its overall better
performance. This again, provides also additional support to the ECB policy
of late interventions (called end-of-theperiod ﬁne-tuning operations).
To summarise the ﬁndings of that section, the most important result is
that the neutral liquidity provision policy, just oﬀsetting the liquidity shock
can be improved by even relatively simple optimisation algorithm. Also daily
OMO tend to prevent the rates from excess volatility and but require higher
level of the central bank intervention. Daily OMO require also changing the
market liquidity in diﬀerent stages of the maintenance period.
24Figure 2. Bank borrowing5.3 No reserve requirement
This section contains the results of the simulations for regime without reserve
requirement. In practice, countries that applied these type of regime have also
committed to frequent liquidity supplying injections to counter for the liquidity
shocks. Since there is no deﬁciency that needs to be covered, the only purpose
the funds serve is to secure commercial banks from incoming late liquidity
s h o c k s ,t h a tc a n n o tb eo ﬀset by the interbank market. In the previous section,
the asset value of the commercial bank sector was set just to make for the
reserve requirement. To keep the results comparable, this time is just set to
zero.
Before moving forward note that with daily OMO the optimal policy
coincides with zero-excess liquidity, hence the results from regime I. and III.
are identical.
Regime type:
Day I II III IV
Trade volume on day:
1 496,0 449,6 524,6 507,7
2 NA 684,7 NA 724,8
3 NA 903,9 NA 879,8
Recursion to CB deposit facilities on day:
1 383,5 275,4 386,0 149,9
2 NA 239,7 NA 122,3
3 NA 193,7 NA 135,7
Recursion to CB lending facilities on day:
1 383,5 281,2 383,9 53,8
2 NA 242,9 NA 35,7
3 NA 193,7 NA 43,7
Standard deviation on day:
1 0,000 0,284 0,00 0,15
2 NA 0,213 NA 0,11
3 NA 0,000 NA 0,12
Average excess liquidity left after intervention on day:
1 0,0 0,0 0,0 96,3
2 0,0 0,0 0,0 86,9
3 0,0 0,0 0,0 92,4
Table 2. No reserve requirement
The volume of trade is in general lower than in corresponding cases
with the reserve requirement regime, but this just reﬂects the fact that
without maintenance period this turns to be one-period model, hence the
assets variance decreases. The market still works eﬃciently, with the
end-of-trade banks liquidity (sum of initial assets, shock realisation and
interbank borrowing) close to zero.
Limited liquidity on the market is transferred to the extend the standing
facilities are used. Now that there is no cushion from funds kept the reserve
26requirement, and most banks ending the trade with zero balance, they must
rely on the central bank to oﬀset their late liquidity shock. Periodic OMO do
not change that outcome signiﬁcantly.
Without reserve requirement the rate responses very strongly to any
changes in aggregate liquidity, but once it is exactly balanced, the volatility
vanishes completely (the result already derived analytically in section 4.1).
Increased sensitivity is due to the shape of demand curves (such as the ones on
the ﬁgure 2.) which are very elastic in the last day of the maintenance period.
After aggregation, it transforms even relatively small liquidity shortage into
large deviation from the target, a result that was observed by all researchers
in the ﬁeld. Zero variance with no excess funds follows just the logic of the
base model, and property (4.1), hence the results for the daily OMO and last
day of periodic regime.
Finally the last look on the value of liquidity if the OMO are performed
on a periodic basis. It seems that in that case, most eﬀective policy would
on average supply at least some liquidity, which reduces the use of lending
facilities. It does not however improve the volatility of the rates which remains
at high level.
T oc o n c l u d et h em o s ti m p o r t a n tﬁndings is that the zero-excess liquidity
drives the rates variance to zero, but any excess (or shortage) of funds results
in much higher volatility and use of standing facilities, compared to reserve
requirement regime. It also leads to higher level of late intervention (in form
of standing facilities or alternatively ﬁne-tuning operations) with the market
left without any liquidity buﬀer to oﬀset late shocks.
5.4 Diﬀerent maintenance period dates
This section contain the analysis of a regime where the banks are still obliged
to satisfy reserve requirement, but the maintenance period for diﬀerent banks
(or group of banks) ends at diﬀerent days. In our model, there are three
maintenance period dates with 3 diﬀerent banks groups. The total size of the
market remained unchanged, hence each group is the size of 1/3 of the total
number of banks. The value of assets (hence market liquidity) is kept at the
same level as in the simulation with regular maintenance period, so it is just
enough to satisfy individual bank deﬁciency.
The results of simulation seem to indicate that the banking sector is no
more eager to trade than in the setups analysed so far. In fact in case of
d a i l yO M Ot h ev o l u m ei se v e ns m a l l e r . A tt h es a m et i m et h e ,t h eo p t i m a l
OMO value stays close to zero, indicating no excess liquidity. This gives
support to the line of discussion from the paragraph 3.2.3. It is not optimal for
the banks to ignore the reserve requirement completely, and count that they
are going to satisfy it in the last period of its own maintenance period. Hence
there is no ground for worries about banks overcoming reserve requirement
whenever they are allowed for diﬀerent maintenance period dates.
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Day I II III IV
Trade volume on day:
1 479,5 770,9 401,9 760,9
2 NA 907,1 NA 899,8
3 NA 953,7 NA 946,4
Recursion to CB deposit facilities on day:
1 117,2 157,5 93,7 126,4
2 NA 266,9 NA 214,5
3 NA 319,9 NA 268,3
Recursion to CB lending facilities on day:
1 97,6 127,8 101,6 125,3
2 NA 245,4 NA 243,6
3 NA 305,8 NA 302,5
Standard deviation on day:
1 0,134 0,192 0,009 0,092
2 NA 0,206 NA 0,086
3 NA 0,201 NA 0,114
Average excess liquidity left after intervention on day:
1 0,0 0,0 -1,5 -34,4
2 0,0 0,0 0,0 -48,3
3 0,0 0,0 0,0 -40,0
Table 3. Diﬀerent maintenance periods
So what is the eﬀectiveness of this operational policy as measured by the
use of standing facilities and volatility of interest rates?
The ﬁrst observation is that the spikes or regular patterns in the interest
rates behaviour are gone. Little ﬂuctuations in the standing facilities usage,
present only in the regime with periodic open market operations are due to
increased variance of assets between allotment dates.
The second observation is that how eﬀective this regime is (comparing to
traditional reserve requirement) depends much on the frequency of the open
market operations. In case of daily OMO the variance of the interest rates
drops almost to the lowest level observed usually in maintenance period. It
is not so clear with periodic OMO regimes, (especially for the case where
optimisation algorithm is used) but the same general trend exists. It can be
therefore concluded that introduction of diﬀerent maintenance period ending
dates leads to signiﬁcant reduction of the periodic spikes in volatility, at the
same time keeping average level at relatively low level.
The analysis of the usage of standing facilities does lead to a similar
conclusions. First of all, remember that only 1/3 of the number of banks
used
in previous simulations now ends the maintenance period at the same day.
Comparing to the situation where most of the facilities were used in the last
period, it is no wonder signiﬁcant improvement can be made. Once again using
the optimisation algorithm helps to improve the results even further.
28To summarise the results of that section, ﬁrst the concerns about banks
using diﬀerent maintenance dates system as a tool to trade liquidity between
themselves seem to be misplaced. No increase in trade volume or permanently
change aggregate liquidity is needed. When analysing the rates volatility the
system works eﬃciently in case of daily OMO and although the results for
periodic OMO, they point to the same direction.
5.5 Summary of results
The above sections contain the results for market volatility resulting from
diﬀerent policy setups. It is not the goal of the study to decide in favour of
any of them, yet a short comparison might be an interesting exercise.
The trade-oﬀ between frequency of liquidity supply operations and stability
of interest rates has been acknowledged in the literature. The results from
that simulations seem to conﬁrm that intuition. Indeed, the lowest volatility
(actually -no volatility) is enjoyed by the regime without reserve requirement
or other market frictions, with perfect forecasts of incoming liquidity shock
and the Central Bank eager to supply massive amounts of liquidity both in
early (OMO) and late (standing facilities) stage.
A bit more realistic scenario, also with very good results involves averaging
provision and daily OMO. Apart from obvious technical diﬃculties from daily
operations, it involves also shifting huge amounts of liquidity between diﬀerent
days.
Allowing banks for diﬀerent maintenance period dates, succeeds in
removing the spikes or periodic patterns from the data, but requires more
late intervention during all days instead of the last one only.
There is one common point in all that regimes, a very important result
of that study: even a relatively simple optimisation algorithm indicates that
even though the aggregate liquidity matters, at least as much important is
the distribution of liquidity among the banks. The same banking sector assets
value might require diﬀerent policies in order to set the rates on target.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper uses simulation studies to compare the behaviour of the interbank
market and CB interventions in diﬀerent structural setups. The starting
point is the model for demand for the funds, based on the construction of
Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-Mendizábal (2001). They analyse the regular
patterns of the interest rate that can be observed in countries using averaging
provision reserve requirement and channel system of standing facilities. The
supply side of the market is given by the Central Bank open market operations,
aiming for setting the interbank rates at some target.
The most important ﬁndings of the paper are that targeting the aggregate
instead of individual bank liquidity is not enough to maintain a low level of
market volatility. Indeed the optimisation algorithm, which calculates the
29optimal allotment taking into account individual information performs much
better than simple policy keeping the market with no excess (or shortage)
liquidity.
Apart from that, the popular view that frequent liquidity supplying
operations result in lower variance also ﬁnds support here. Zero variance is
possible only under the unrealistic scenario where the central bank can predict
the autonomous liquidity factors with 100% probability and there is no reserve
requirement. In that case however the burden of oﬀsetting the late liquidity
shock is totally on the standing facilities, with the interbank market left with
no liquidity. Some speciﬁc features of the money markets such as the volatility
increased toward the end of the maintenance with the averaging provision
regime are replicated here as well. Introducing diﬀerent maintenance period
dates as a new type of regime helps to reduce the periodic spikes, but results
in higher use of standing facilities.
Analysing diﬀerent setups oﬀers an interesting comparison of costs and
beneﬁts of the policies applied by diﬀerent Central Banks, but does not attempt
to evaluate what is the optimal policy for a given country. Answering that
question requires an estimate of how costly the liquidity supplying operations
are for central authorities in diﬀerent countries and what are the determinants
of that cost.
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31Appendix A
Proof the results from section 3.1
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The expected proﬁt function can be then rewritten as
Et (Πt)=itbt − i
l (mt − bt + θt + ε1t)F (−mt + bt − θt − ε1t)
+i














The ﬁrst order conditions for that problem with respect to bt are
−it = i
lF (−mt + bt − θt − ε1t) − i
l (mt − bt + θt + ε1t)f (−mt + bt − θt − ε1t)
−i
d (1 − F (−mt + bt − θt − ε1t))
−i
d (mt − bt + θt + ε1t)f (−mt + bt − θt − ε1t) (A1.4)
+i
l (mt − bt + θt + ε1t)f (−mt + bt − θt − ε1t)
+i
d (mt − bt + θt + ε1t)f (−mt + bt − θt − ε1t)
where the last line follows from Leibniz rule. Rearranging yields
it = i
lF (−mt + bt − θt − ε1t)+i
d (1 − F (−mt + bt − θt − ε1t)) (A1.5)
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Simulation method
B.1 The demand side
I start with the basic case with reserve requirement and 3-day maintenance
period (T)I nt h eﬁrst period each bank decides about the value of optimal
borrowing level based on a) current interest rate b) its own liquidity and c)
expectations about future rates. The last element is necessary to calculate the
derivatives of the value function and I will assume they will be equal to CB
target rate. Using traditional grid method it is possible to calculate the value
functions in all possible states in period T (last day). By substituting these
values into eq. (3.9) one can compute analogous derivatives in period T − 1
and ﬁnally use them to calculate the optimal borrowing for some initial guess
of the interest rates at T −2. The same procedure is repeated for all N banks
to come up with the aggregate borrowing until the market clearing condition
is satisﬁed, or no further improvement can be made.
Once the interest rate and optimal borrowing for each bank participant in
T − 2 a r ek n o w n . Ic a nm o v et of o l l o w i n gp e r i o d sT − 1 and T. Each time
shock realisations move the system to new states (ie assets and deﬁciency) for
which above procedure is repeated.
The behaviour of the interbank system without reserve requirements
replicates simply the last stage of the procedure above, using diﬀerent
parameters of the monetary policy (such as narrow borders of the channel
system).
Finally in the last regime, banks have diﬀerent maintenance periods. To
capture that I have created three groups of banks, n banks in each, that
share common end of maintenance period date. The n is set in a way so
the total number of banks is similar in all setups. Then, given market rate
one can compute the individual demands for each group members, using the
procedure already described above. The resulting rate satisﬁes market clearing
conditions. After the rate and the lending is calculated, I use them to come
up with a next day deﬁciencies (except of course for the group that starts new
maintenance period, in which case they are reset to the initial values) and
assets. To ensure that these results are comparable with other setups (where
I had only 3 periods) I reset the asset value of all banks every 3rd iteration
(otherwise assets value following random walk are becoming more volatile with
each round of the simulation).
B.2 The supply side
The value of cenral bank allotment is detrmined in two diﬀerent ways. One
— called here zero-excess liquidity — just supplied the value of funds equal to
the sum of autonomous liquidity factors, so the market is left with neutral
liquidity. A second way is to use a simple optimisation algorithm, that takes
some value of allotment, checks what are predicted interest rates and if any
improvement can be made by changing liquidity value. Once the decision has
33been made about the optimal allotment value, it is distributed evenly among
market participants.
Analysing the supply policy, note that between OMO and the opening of
interbank market, another shock realisation occurs (denoted ε1t in the paper)
meaning, that the rate that is calculated in the optimisation alrorithm and
ﬁnal end-of-the-day rate are going to be diﬀerent, if only the distribution of
shocks matters (which is the ﬁnding of the paper).
The parameters of the simulation are set so the model is comparable with
earlier research. Increasing the shock variance or decreasing market assets
results in higher rates volatility, but the results are generally robust.
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